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In this commentary on Kraeutner et al.’s (2018) paper we first outline a popular 33 
theoretical framework, which is useful for conceptualising their findings. We then discuss 34 
the implications of their data for contemporary perspectives on imagery ability, which 35 
promote an individualised account. Finally, we describe novel methodologies for 36 
enhancing imagery ability within this context. 37 
According to Jeannerod’s (2006) principle of functional equivalence, executing, 38 
imagining and observing action involves motor regions in the brain that at least partially 39 
overlap with one another. While ‘actual’ actions involve a covert phase (e.g., motor planning) 40 
followed by overt execution, action ‘simulation states’ (derived through imagery and/or 41 
observation) are primarily covert, in that they typically occur in the absence of motor execution 42 
(Frank & Schack, 2017). Simulation states can vary in the degree to which they involve covert 43 
activation of the motor system, and the factors that moderate this variation are a topic of great 44 
discussion. For instance, relatively little is known about the effects of motor experience (e.g., 45 
in elite athletes) for a given simulation state.  46 
In general terms, motor imagery (MI) elicits cortical activity that is more bilateral and 47 
widespread compared to motor execution. Similarly, the activation of brain regions during MI 48 
is more bilateral and diffuse in novice performers, compared to their more experienced 49 
counterparts (Burianová et al., 2013). Presumably a novice with little experience of physically 50 
executing the imagined action will have an inefficient and/or unorganised network of 51 
neurocognitive processes underlying their imagery (Bar & DeSouza, 2016). Physical practice 52 
should therefore serve to refine and organise these neural networks (i.e., a neural efficiency 53 
effect). Indeed, studies have shown physical practice reduces the neurophysiological activity 54 
present during imagery of the practiced action, in regions specific to the task (Lacourse et al., 55 
2005). Kraeutner et al.’s (2018) data help to rule out the potential confound in cross-sectional 56 
studies that used only a between-group (expert vs. novice) design. While they found no clear 57 
differences during MI of two highly practiced action types (sport-specific vs. non-sport 58 
specific) within two expert groups (basketball vs. volleyball players), neurophysiological 59 
involvement was comparatively more widespread and bilateral within both expert groups when 60 
they imagined performing an unpracticed action. Notably, these cortical activation patterns 61 
for the unpracticed actions resembled those in a novice group during imagery of the same 62 
unpracticed action. 63 
While those authors did not asses their participants’ ability to physically execute nor 64 
imagine these actions, the more specific activation patterns for practiced actions conceivably 65 
reflect an enhanced ability to both perform and therefore imagine these actions. Accordingly, 66 
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imagery ability, at least in the motor domain, appears dependent on a performer’s prior physical 67 
exposure to the imagined action. While motor abilities are typically defined in terms of 68 
movement outcomes, a key question is how should we define the ability to imagine 69 
movements? 70 
Theoretical accounts often remain vague or unresolved regarding the nature of imagery 71 
ability. A long-standing assumption, however, is that the capacity for imagery is not simply an 72 
undifferentiated general skill, but rather it is a skill that can be parsed into a series of sub-73 
attributes. Cumming and Eaves (2018) recently proposed that the ability to imagine something 74 
relates to more than image generation and maintenance over time, but also to how we might 75 
inspect, transform and repurpose these images for specific outcomes. It follows that 76 
undertaking mental practice, as it relates to one or more of these cognitive sub-components, 77 
should produce an individual difference gradient of imagery ability within each facet.  78 
It was Galton (1880) who first observed that the detail and clarity with which 79 
individuals experience mental imagery will involve an individual difference gradient across 80 
any given population. Here we argue this gradient effect should be examined not only at some 81 
global level of imagery ability, but it should also be quantified independently within each of 82 
the sub-attributes as well. An intriguing question arising from Kraeutner et al.’s (2018) work 83 
is how these independent cognitive processes might be reflected in the differential activations 84 
of neural substrate for practiced vs. unpracticed actions, and how these patterns might change 85 
over time due to the nature of training undertaken within specific sub-sets of imagery skills. 86 
Ultimately, the development of a more nuanced definition of imagery ability will in turn help 87 
us to identify the most appropriate tools to both measure and improve the core characteristics. 88 
One imagery training protocol that is well-suited to a more individualised account of 89 
imagery ability is Layered Stimulus Response Training (LSRT). LSRT is intended to help 90 
people more easily generate and control their imagery experience by breaking down different 91 
elements of an image, before bringing them together again in progressive layers (Cumming & 92 
Eaves, 2018). To improve its effectiveness, this method can also be used in conjunction with 93 
the instruction to perform motor imagery during action observation (AO+MI). This entails 94 
imagining the kinaesthetic sensations of action, while synchronising this simulation with the 95 
concurrently observed action (Eaves et al., 2016a).  96 
A strong evidence base of multimodal neurophysiological studies now 97 
demonstrates cortico-motor activity is significantly increased during AO+MI compared to 98 
either independent imagery or observation of the same action (e.g., Eaves et al., 2016b; Macuga 99 
& Frey, 2012; see Eaves et al., 2016a), and that this moderates behavioural outcomes such as 100 
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force production (Scott et al., 2017) and automatic imitation (Eaves et al., 2014). The suggested 101 
benefits of using combined AO+MI, rather than MI independently, is that it promotes an 102 
increase in on-going attention to the observed action, which will intuitively offer continuous 103 
and helpful opportunities for refining and updating the imagined (yet independent) internal 104 
representation of the same action in real-time. In a sense, the action simulation derived through 105 
observation might act as a type of scaffolding upon which the imagery-driven simulation can 106 
be structured. In line with Kraeutner and colleagues’ findings, this method would appear 107 
particularly useful for constructing action representations that are not currently in the 108 
performer’s repertoire, that is, those characterised by the more diffuse and bilateral activation 109 
patterns. 110 
Combining LSRT with AO+MI methods now represents a clear opportunity to 111 
investigate and train specific components of imagery ability. A fruitful avenue for future 112 
research, which is motivated (at least in part) by Kraeutner et al.’s (2018) timely paper, will be 113 
to examine how these methods might impact neural efficiency effects over time.  114 
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